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It is now fifteen years ago that the Berlin Wall fell, the start of a vast set of 
changes throughout the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. Reforms in the Communist world had started earlier further east: first 
in China in the late 1970s and in Vietnam in the mid 1980s. The changes affected 
society in a multitude of ways. They affected the way the political and economic 
system operated but also the social organization of society, the psychology of 
the people living in the countries, and the culture of day-to-day life.  
 
In this essay I focus on how these changes affected the rural economy and the 
agricultural and food sector. I will discuss developments and performances of 
the countries during transition, the causes behind them, and the policy lessons 
they imply. My analysis relies heavily on work I have done with various co-
authors on these issues and I refer to these publications for details on some of 
the issues and arguments which I will forward here somewhat too brief to do 
justice to their complexity. For more detailed arguments and analyses I refer in 
particular to Rozelle and Swinnen (2004) and Macours and Swinnen (2000, 2002).  
 
2.  Decline and growth during transition 
 
When looking at the transformation of the rural economies and the agri-food 
sector of transition economies, one observes at the same time similar 
characteristics and diverging patterns. It is from confronting the similarities 
and the diverging experiences that one can learn and try to identify the factors 
affecting the economic behaviour of the systems. 
                                                 
1 Swinnen is professor of Economics and Director of LICOS − Centre for Transition Economics, 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/LICOS). Contact address: 
Johan.Swinnen@econ.kuleuven.ac.be. 
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Performance differs strongly among transition countries. One can distinguish 
three “extreme” patterns in agricultural transition, summarized in Figures 1 
and 2 for the first decade of transition.  
•  Pattern I (“Central Europe”): A strong decline in gross agricultural output 
(GAO) coincides with a strong increase in output per worker because of 
a strong outflow of labour from agriculture. This is the pattern followed 
by the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary: GAO declines by around 
30% during the first years of transition, but stabilizes after 4 years. At 
the same time, agricultural labour productivity (ALP) increases rapidly: 
on average around 10% annually during the first 9 years of transition. 
•  Pattern II (“Russia”): A strong decline in GAO coincides with a strong 
decline in ALP. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are typical examples of this 
pattern, as are several other Newly Independent States (NIS). On 
average, output fell by almost 50% in these countries and labour 
productivity by around 30%.  
•  Pattern III (“China”): A strong increase in GAO coincides with an, albeit 
slower, increase in ALP. Examples are China, Vietnam, and, in Europe, 
also Albania. On average, output increased by more than 50% in China 
and Vietnam, while labour productivity increased by 25%.  
 
The causes of these differences in performance include both variations in reform 
policies and in initial conditions.2 While most recognize the impact of both 
factors, there has been a strong debate on the relative importance of the various 
factors, which has been most intense on what the Chinese reforms imply for 
reforms elsewhere. Chinese reforms have resulted in extraordinary growth and 
are argued to have been successful because they were “gradual”, in contrast to 
reforms in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and the former 
Soviet Union (FSU) (Roland & Verdier, 1999). However, others have argued 
that the difference in structural characteristics of the Chinese economy at the 
outset of transition makes it a unique situation, with very little policy lessons 




2 The discussion here draws heavily on several studies in which we estimated the impact of 
reform policies and initial conditions, and their 'intermediate results', (i.e. changes in relative 
prices, farm restructuring, changes in property rights and overall economic liberalization), on 
performance, i.e. agricultural productivity and output. Two studies (Macours & Swinnen, 
2000b, 2002) use aggregate data for 15 transition countries; the third (Macours & Swinnen, 
2000a) uses annual data on crop output for eight CEECs. A more comprehensive survey is in 
Rozelle and Swinnen (2004).  

































Note:  * “China” is the average for China and Vietnam; “Central Europe” is the average for Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary; and “Russia” is the average for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.  
Source:  Own calculations based on data from OECD and FAO. 

































Note:  * “China” is the average for China and Vietnam; “Central Europe is the average for Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary; and “Russia” is the average for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.  
Source:   Own calculations based on data from OECD, FAO, ADB and national statistics.  
Figure 2:  Changes in Agricultural Labour Productivity (ALP)* 
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3.  Impact of initial conditions 
 
Initial conditions vary substantially among the countries (see Table 1). At the 
outset of transition, China and Vietnam had the lowest GNP/capita level. 
Related to the level of development, the share of agriculture in employment 
was considerably higher in China (around 70%) than in Russia (less than 20%), 
and was the lowest in Central Europe (13%). China and Vietnam had a very 
labour-intensive agriculture. The man/land ratio was higher than one, compared 
to less than 0.15 in Central Europe and Russia. 
 
Table 1: Initial Conditions and Policies in the Transition Patterns* 
  Patterns 
  Central Europe  Russia  China 
Initial Conditions (IC)     
  GNP/capita PPP    6803  950 
  Share of agriculture in employment  13  17  70 
  Agric. labour intensity  0.13  0.09  1.49 
  Legal land ownership  Individuals°  State  State 
  Pre-reform agricultural price policy   Subsidized  Subsidized  Taxed 
  Years under central planning  42  73  32 
Reform Policies (RP)     
  Land reform procedure  Restitution°  Share distribution  Physical distri 
  Property rights reform  Fast  Slow  Fast 
Policy Outcomes (PO)#    
  Relative price change    -60  +24 
  Use rights    Weak  Strong 
  % agricultural land in individual farms  16  11  99 
  Overall liberalization index  0.86  0.60  0.15 
Notes:  * The values are the averages of the representative countries from each pattern (Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
and Hungary for “Central Europe”; Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus for “Russia”; China and Vietnam for 
“China”).  
° Part of the land in Hungary was owned by collective farms and (therefore) only one-third of Hungarian 
land was restituted; the rest was privatized through compensation bonds and physical distribution.  
# Five years after start of the reforms. 
Source:   Macours and Swinnen (2002). 
 
Pre-transition agriculture in all countries in Table 1 was characterized by the 
dominance of large-scale farms.3 In China, the collective farms had legal and 
effective property rights while in Vietnam land was state owned but the 
effective property rights were controlled by the collective farms. In Russia and 
other FSU countries land was nationalized during communism, while in 
Central Europe most collective farm land was still legally owned by 
individuals, while effective property rights were controlled by the state or the 
collective farms.  
                                                 
3 Only in former Yugoslavia, Poland, Laos and Myanmar a majority of agricultural land was 
managed by individual (family) farms. 
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The collectivisation of agriculture and introduction of central planning 
occurred after the Second World War in Central Europe and East Asia, while 
in Russia at the beginning of the century. Experience with private and 
individual farming was hence more likely to be present in the rural 
households in the first group of countries.  
 
In China and Vietnam agriculture was heavily taxed, while in most of the 
CEECs and the FSU, agriculture was generally supported with heavy 
subsidies. Also, pre-reform, China and Vietnam mainly traded with non-
CMEA4 countries, while the FSU countries were fully integrated in the CMEA 
system, trading mainly with other communist countries. The Central 
European countries were a bit less integrated, but still a large part of their 
trade volume went through the CMEA system. 
 
To estimate the impact of initial conditions, we used a combination of a 
principal component analysis and regression analysis in Macours and 
Swinnen (2000b). We show that six indicators of initial conditions (see Table 1) 
can be captured by two principal components:  
•  PC1 has high negative weight for income level, and high positive 
weights for labour intensity and the importance of agriculture in the 
economy, and can therefore be interpreted as an index of the level of 
development at the beginning of transition. 
•  PC2 has high positive weights for years under central planning and 
integration in the CMEA, and a high negative weight for land in private 
ownership pre-reform, and can be interpreted as an index of the level of 
distortions at the beginning of transition. 
 
Figure 3 plots all the countries according to these indices of development 
(PC1) and distortion (PC2). The three patterns of transition, based on 
performance, can be clearly distinguished within these initial conditions 
classification: Central Europe with a higher level of development (PC1) and 
lower pre-reform distortions (PC2). Russia, Ukraine and Belarus differ mostly 
from this first group by higher pre-reform distortions. China and Vietnam had 
a much lower level of development than the two other groups, and medium 
levels of distortions. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), also sometimes referred to as 
COMECON system, refers to countries where trade was ‘centrally’ planned and managed by 
trade arrangements between the countries.  




















































































Source:  Macours and Swinnen (2000b). 
Figure 3:  Classification by principal components of initial conditions: index of pre-
reform development (PC 1) and index of pre-reform distortions (PC 2) 
 
Our regressions show that during the first years of transition, agricultural 
output d e v e l o p m e n t s  w e r e  t o  a n  i m p o r t ant extent determined by initial 
conditions, both directly and indirectly, through their effect on policy 
outcomes. However, the results of the estimations also suggest that 
(exogenous) reform policy choices played an important role in determining 
labour productivity developments during the first years of transition. After 
correcting for the endogenous part of the different policy outcomes the 
establishment of strong use rights and the overall liberalization of the 
economy has a significant positive effect on agricultural labour productivity. 
Let us now go into more detail on the impact of the reform policies. 
 
4.  Impact of reform policies 
 
The relative price changes following price and trade liberalization have importantly 
affected the post-reform output developments. These liberalizations, in combination 
with subsidy cuts and the collapse of the CMEA trading system resulted in a 
dramatic fall of relative prices for farms, and in output. Figure 4 shows a 
positive relationship between the relative price changes and the output 
changes after the first 5 years of the reform. Importantly, the only TCs where 
GAO has increased during transition are the countries where relative prices 
have increased – and vice versa. Macours and Swinnen (2000a) estimate that 
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terms of trade effects caused 40-50% of the fall in average crop output in eight 
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Source:  Macours and Swinnen (2002). 
Figure 4:  Output and price changes after 5 years of reform in 15 transition countries 
 
The shift from collective farming to individual (family) farming had a positive impact 
on agricultural output. Due to monitoring problems, the incentive to work in a 
cooperative farm is lower than in an individual farm. After the change of 
agricultural production from collective farms to individual farms the income 
of the farmer is directly related with the performance of the farm, and 
therefore individual farming increased incentives for labour effort. This causes 
an increase in the productivity of labour as well as in the intensity with which 
the other inputs are used, as was also found in other studies on China (Lin, 
1992) and Vietnam (Pingali & Xuan, 1992). 
 
Interestingly, the shift to individual farms had a negative impact on average 
labour productivity in agriculture as the positive impact on labour 
productivity of improved labour effort and lower monitoring costs was more 
than offset by other effects. First, the fragmentation of assets induced by the 
break-up of collective farms had a negative impact. Second, substitution of 
other inputs by labour contributed to the negative relationship with average 
labour productivity. Substitution of other inputs by labour can be caused both 
by the increase in the marginal productivity of labour, ceteris paribus, with the 
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shift to individual farms and by a change in the relative price of labour vis-à-
vis the cost of other inputs. The latter is reinforced by capital constraints and 
credit market imperfections, which are widespread during agricultural 
transition. Finally, in food insecure circumstances worker owners will prefer 
individual farming rather than leaving agriculture. 
 
Privatization and land reform affected performance differently depending  (a) on 
how it affected property rights, and (b) on the environment. Regarding 
property rights one can distinguish between use rights and transfer rights. 
Transfer rights have been established in Central Europe, and after 1994 also in 
Russia. Although land transfers have occurred on some occasions in China, 
there is no legal framework guaranteeing the transfer right of land. However, 
even in the TCs where land transfer rights are legal, land sales are de facto 
largely absent during the period we analyse. Still, leasing or transfer of use 
rights had an important impact on land allocation.  
 
The restitution process, as in Central Europe, and the land distribution process 
in China created stronger individual use rights than the share distribution 
process in Russia and Ukraine. Despite the allocation of land shares to 
members, important transaction costs limited the effective use rights of the 
individual owners.  
 
These differences are important since the transfer of effective use rights to 
individuals generally induced a decline in output and an increase in 
productivity. The creation of effective use rights caused profit-maximizing 
behaviour with hard budget constraints. This resulted in a reduction of 
surplus input use and therefore a decline of output. At the same time it 
improved the allocation and efficiency of input use, causing an increase in 
productivity. 
 
The impact of privatisation on productivity is conditional upon liberalization in 
the rest of the economy. In particular, slow liberalization resulted in significant 
rigidities in the capital and labour market, reducing both the inflow of capital 
for working capital and investments, and the outflow of surplus labour. 
Macours and Swinnen (2000a) conclude that because of these market 
imperfections the direct efficiency impact of privatisation in countries such as 
Romania and Bulgaria was negative, while being positive in the Central 
European countries, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, where 
liberalization had removed factor market imperfections to a greater extent. In 
countries such as Romania and Albania, productivity gains from privatization 
arrived primarily indirectly through the shift to individual farming.  
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Furthermore, in Central Europe strong productivity gains occurred despite a 
relatively limited shift to individual farming. Compared to Russia and Ukraine 
where large-scale farms continued to dominate as well, farms in Central 
Europe generally have undergone more effective restructuring, including both 
management reform and operation adjustments. In contrast, Lerman and 
Csaki (1997) report that, despite some downsizing in restructured farms, 
internal reorganization has not produced deep results in Russia and Ukraine 
and the collective framework has preserved most of its traditional function. As 
a result of this lack of restructuring, Sedik, Trueblood and Arnade (1999) 
measure a decline in efficiency on the large farms during transition in Russia.  
 
Finally, organization and contract disruptions caused a decline in output and 
productivity during transition. External disruptions resulted from the collapse 
of the CMEA trading system. Internal disruptions resulted from the break-up 
of the strong integrated system of supply chains, with the central planner as 
enforcement mechanism. The break-up of this contracting system with 
privatisation, restructuring, and liberalization, in the absence of alternative 
contract enforcement mechanisms and information distribution systems 
caused important drops in output and investment (McMillan, 1997). Several 
explanations of this result focus on the disruptions of relation-specific 
investments, due to information problems, search frictions, and absence of 
contract enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Rozelle (1996) explains how the initial and abrupt liberalization of the fertilizer 
market in China in 1985 caused major disruptions in fertilizer supplies, 
leading the government to retake control of fertilizer sales in 1987. Five years 
later, during which time China’s domestic marketing capacity developed, new 
fertilizer liberalization resulted in no disruption. 
 
Macours and Swinnen (2000a) estimate that between 30% and 60% of average 
crop output decline in CEECs was due to institutional disruptions. Based on a 
case study of the Slovakian sugar sector, Gow and Swinnen (1998) show that 
output and yields increased dramatically, both at the processing and at the 
farm level after new (FDI-induced) contract enforcement mechanisms and 
solutions to input contracting were implemented. The solution to contract 
hold-ups in this case – as in other transition countries (McMillan, 1997) – 
comes from private rather than public enforcement.  
 
5.  Patterns of rural transition 
 
Table 1  summarizes the relationship between the differences in economic 
performance and the initial conditions, the key reform policies and the policy 
  25Agrekon, Vol 44, No 1 (March 2005)  Swinnen 
 
 
outcomes. Both Russia and Central Europe were characterized by pre-reform 
subsidization of agriculture, relatively low labour intensity of farms and a 
small share of agriculture in the economy but differ in the pre-reform land 
ownership and the period under central planning. While both in Russia and 
Central Europe terms of trade declined in agriculture following price and 
trade liberalization due to pre-reform taxation of agriculture, the choice and 
implementation of privatisation, land reform and overall liberalization policies 
differed substantially.  
 
In Central Europe, land reform through restitution and physical distribution 
led to stronger individual property rights. Further, the more extensive and 
more radical liberalization of the general economy in Central Europe reduced 
obstacles for intersectoral labour mobility. In contrast, in Russia land 
ownership rights were allocated under the form of shares in the former 
collective and state farms, causing weak individual property rights and 
limited incentives for resource allocation improvements. Also, the dependence 
of individuals on farms for food security and social benefits, such as housing, 
further reduced mobility and the outflow of labour from agriculture. In 
combination with low overall liberalization and the lack of individual farming 
skills after several generations of communist rule, labour mobility from farms 
and to other sectors is constrained. Hence surplus labour has not left 
agriculture and is trapped in large-scale farms that continue to be dominated 
by old management. The consequence is that with decreasing terms of trade, 
while GAO has declined to a similar extent as in Central Europe, ALP has 
fallen with GAO in Russia, while it increased strongly in Central Europe. 
 
A third pattern, followed by China and Vietnam is characterized by growth in 
both output and productivity during transition. These countries started from a 
very labour-intensive agriculture, which was taxed. Price and trade 
liberalization caused an improvement in the terms of trade. Institutional 
reforms included the distribution of clear and strong land use rights to farm 
workers and rural households, and a complete break-up of the collective 
and/or state farms into individual farms. Because of the high labour intensity 
(and low labour productivity) on the collective farms the shift to individual 
farming implied important benefits because of improved labour incentives 
and profit maximization, and low costs from fragmentation. The strong shift to 
individual farming was also stimulated by the low level of income in these 
TCs where food security concerns played an important role: in all these TCs 
radical and widespread decollectivization emerged to some extent 
spontaneous – as a reaction to a major crisis.  
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In combination these factors contributed to increases in GAO and ALP. 
However, the food security concerns as well as the link between social benefits 
(such as housing) and economic sectors increased intersectoral (and rural-
urban) mobility costs, contributing to the slower growth of labour 
productivity than output.  
 
Institutional and organizational disruptions contributed to investment and 
output declines. They are argued to have been more important in Central 
Europe and Russia than in China with its more ‘gradual approach’ to market 
liberalization. Several analyses show that these disruptions have caused 
important declines in output. 
 
However, our analysis suggests that key determinants of output growth in 
China are (a) the terms of trade effect – which was importantly determined by 
the pre-reform taxation of agriculture – and (b) radical reforms in the 
allocation of land property rights and in the re-organization of agricultural 
production. In fact, Albania, the only European country with similar structural 
characteristics as China (and Vietnam), introduced radical market 
liberalization causing strong disruptions in the exchange relationships. This 
has not prevented it from recording high growth rates in GAO as in China 
(and Vietnam) – in fact, since the start of the reform in 1991 and despite the 
chaos following the 1997 political upheaval, average GAO growth in Albania 
has been almost 10% annually (Cungu & Swinnen, 1999).  
 
All this suggests that key determinants of agricultural growth during the first 
years of transition in China have also been initial conditions, (radical) land 
reform and farm restructuring. Hence, one should be careful and nuanced in 
using the “Chinese miracle” as an example for advocating gradual reforms in 
other transition countries. 
 
6.  Conclusions and lessons 
 
1. Pricing policy and shifts in relative prices between the pre-reform and post-reform 
eras have played an important role in output changes. Virtually all reformers 
sought to bring their pricing structure more in line with international prices so 
they would better reflect the relative scarcities of resources and consumer 
demands. In the process of eliminating the distortions, however, relative 
prices moved in one direction in East Asia and the opposite elsewhere. During 
the planning era, China and Vietnam had tried to force industrialization in 
part by taxing agriculture with low prices in order to keep wages of industrial 
workers low. Their counterparts in most of CEE and the CIS nations, in 
contrast, had tried to stimulate food production by subsidizing inputs and 
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providing high bonuses for marketed surplus. Hence, in the rationalization of 
prices, reformers in East Asia raised the prices of output, which strengthened 
the output-to-input price ratio. At the same time, their counterparts outside 
East Asia eliminated planning and many or all of the input subsidies and 
output premiums which led to plummeting output-to-input price ratios. Since 
producers in all transition economies responded to price changes similarly 
(increasing output as output prices rose and decreasing output as input prices 
rose and vice versa), the direction of the price changes after reform help 
explains why East Asia’s output moved up in the initial post reform era and 
those of CEE and the CIS nations trended down.  
 
2. We should be careful about which indicator we use to measure transition 
performance.  If we use an indicator of efficiency or productivity instead of 
output, it is less clear that agricultural transition in Central Europe was less 
successful than that in China and Vietnam. If prices need to reflect long-run 
scarcity values of outputs and inputs, then efficiency requires that leader 
raised agricultural prices in East Asia, a move that naturally would lead to 
higher output. Likewise, when subsidies were removed, rational producers 
should use less inputs, actions, which as seen by the record in CEE and the CIS 
where the ratio of output-to-input prices fell sharply, led to falling output in 
these countries. In short, although leaders in many countries count increases in 
output as success, productivity shifts, not production trends, should be the 
primary metric for measuring success in transition agricultures.  
 
3. Market liberalization policies reinforced the shifts caused by relative price changes 
and also help explain the sharp collapse in Central Europe and Russia during early 
transition. When reformers took control in many East European countries the 
systems through which the pre-reform producers had purchased their inputs 
and sold their output disappeared. Hence, it is easy to understand why 
production and productivity fell so dramatically in the first year or two after 
reform. In retrospect such a fall should have been expected since it is hard to 
conceive how completely new institution s  o f  e x c h a n g e  c o u l d  e m e r g e  i n  a  
matter of months. Perhaps more surprising is the speed in which institutions 
of exchange re-emerged in Central Europe. Although deep markets 
characterized by the meeting of numerous buyers and sellers still had not 
materialized after several years of reform, the Central European experience 
shows how alternative institutions appeared to facilitate exchange. In those 
countries in which the institutions emerged, output and productivity began to 
recover by the mid 1990s and productivity growth has continued since. In 
those countries in which such institutions did not emerged, productivity 
continued to lag. 
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In East Asia reformers moved more gradually and in the initial years almost 
made no change to the state-dominated marketing channels that were set up 
during the planning era. So while market liberalization did not play much of a 
role in pushing up output and productivity of East Asian producers in the 
initial years after reform, it did not hold it back. In the longer run, however, 
policies in East Asia facilitated the entry of thousands of private traders and 
the gradual rise of markets in the post-reform era has been linked with 
positive, albeit small, productivity increases. 
 
4. Property rights reform, and the farm restructuring that it facilitated, induced a rise 
of productivity in transition countries. It certainly was true in East Asia. Also in 
several Central European countries empirical studies identify the positive 
links between property rights reform and productivity. But while the effects of 
land reform have both been positive and strong, the mechanism that has led to 
enhanced performance in East Asia and Central Europe has been quite different. 
I n  E a s t  A s i a  i n c o m e  a n d  c o n t r o l  r i g h t s  w e r e  g i v e n  t o  p r o d u c e r s ,  c r e a t i n g  
millions of new family-run farms. Land ownership remained with the state and 
privatisation of land is still being debated today. The partial reforms, however, 
appear to have provided enough incentives and improved decision-making 
capacity to have ignited the rapid rise in output and productivity in Asia.  
 
In contrast, privatisation through restitution characterizes the main way that 
Central European reformers implemented the reforms. The reforms 
themselves, however, were not enough since many of the new landowners 
had long since moved to the cities. Instead, the emergence of land leasing 
contracts allowed the growth of individual farms and the survival of large 
corporate farms (albeit with less labour which was systematically laid off by 
large reorganized farms in the most advanced Central European economies).  
 
The picture in Russia and other CIS nations was fairly bleak in terms of 
property rights reform-induced productivity rises. Land was distributed as 
paper shares to workers of the collectives and state farms. Individuals could 
not identify the piece of land that belonged to any given share, causing weak 
land rights for individuals and undermined their ability to withdraw land 
from the large farms and establish a private farm. As a result, family farming 
emerged only slowly and large farms have had fewer incentives to restructure. 
The lack of clear rights that linked income to effort and inability to provide 
farmers a way to restructure their farms held back any rights-generated output 
or productivity rises.  
 
5. That said, the lesson regarding property rights reforms is nuanced. Good rights and 
the incentives they created certainly contributed to and will continue to affect 
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performance positively. Poor ones undoubtedly account, in part, for the poor 
performance of some agricultural systems. 
 
However, full privatization of land is not needed to induce efficiency gains. In many 
countries the introduction of private ownership and sale of agricultural land 
encountered strong social and political opposition and kept reformers from 
providing a complete complement of rights to producers. For example, the top 
leadership in both China and Vietnam did not allow private ownership of 
agricultural land. Today, in China and Vietnam, farmers still cannot buy or sell 
land. The strong positive effect of rights reform and restructuring on output 
and productivity demonstrates that allocating clear and well-identified land 
use and income rights can by themselves enhance efficiency, investment and 
growth. In contrast, as seen from the cases of many CIS nations, if rights are 
too weak, there is little effect on performance.  
 
Even in the best performing countries, property rights still have many major 
constraints. For example, China’s leaders are still struggling to figure out a way 
to provide more secure tenure rights for farmers. Most pervasive, local leaders 
in many regions of the country continue to periodically expropriate land, 
shifting it among farmers for a variety of reasons (Brandt et al, 2002). Although 
the impact on the investment in land and other long-term farming assets is 
typically found to relatively minor (Hanan Jacoby et al, 2002), poor land tenure 
may be undermining the emergence of rental markets and keeping farm size 
from increasing and precluding farmers from using land as an asset for 
collateral which could be constraining investment in non-farm activities 
(Benjamin & Brandt, 1999). In CEE, observers of land reform are worried about 
excessive land fragmentation (e.g. in the Balkan countries) and monopolistic 
control of large corporate farms in an emerging land market (e.g. in Slovakia). 
 
6. The lessons regarding the impact of farm restructuring also are nuanced. To start, 
it should be noted that except in labour-intensive agricultural economies, the 
individualization of farming should not be counted as an indicator of 
successful transition. Individualization frequently has been accompanied by a 
dramatic reduction in farm size, and in some cases, falling farm size leads to a 
loss of scale efficiencies.  Smaller farmers in most CEE and CIS nations also 
experienced a sharp fall in their access to capital that was available for use in 
production. While moves to small farms may make sense in some labour-
abundant agricultural economies in the short run, in the longer run the 
transition to a modern state means that farm size must be sufficiently large and 
the intensity of capital use should remain fairly high.  
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7. Natural resource availability and initial technology, which vary tremendously 
across the transition world, have played an important role in affecting the impact of 
farm restructuring (Swinnen & Heinegg, 2002). For example, technology 
played a decisive role in creating the success of the break-up of collective 
f a r m s .  W i t h  l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e  t e c h n o l o g y ,  t h e  c o s t  o f  b r e a k i n g  u p  l a r g e  
collective farms in terms of losses of scale economies is smaller, and the gain 
from improved labour incentives from the shift to family farms is larger. As a 
result, since farms in China and Vietnam are much more labour-intensive than 
the typical farm in the rest of the transition world, the reforms that provided 
farmers in East Asian nations incentives and individualized their farms were 
able to create relatively large shifts up in productivity.  
 
In contrast, many regions outside of East Asia were characterized by an 
entirely different farm technology, which greatly affected the impact of farm 
restructuring. Large parts of Russia, Ukraine and Central Asia are land 
a b u n d a n t .  M a n y  o f  t h e  r i c h e r  p a r t s  o f  C E E  a l s o  h a v e  m u c h  l e s s  l a b o u r -
intensive production systems. The returns to breaking up the large-scale farms 
into individual farms in many of these countries necessarily are lower than the 
gains experienced in East Asia.  
 
In some Eastern European countries and some CIS with high labour intensity 
there were also strong benefits from farm individualization. The nations that 
benefited from farm individualization were those in the poor areas of the 
Balkan and Transcaucasian regions. Specifically, the four countries (Albania, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) which have man/land ratios above 0.2 
persons per hectare (ratios that are similar to those of East Asia) are the nations 
that have experienced the highest growth rates of TFP after land was 
distributed to households and large-scale individualization of farms followed. 
Such high rates of productivity gain are similar to those experienced in Asia 
during the first reform years. 
 
8. Even without individualization corporate farms restructuring can lead to strong rises 
of productivity in transition agriculture. One of the main differences between Russia 
and Ukraine, where productivity fell, and some of the European countries, such 
as Hungary and the Czech Republic, where productivity increased, is not so 
much the scale of the farm operations, but rather the degree to which their 
management was restructured. In Central Europe, farm enterprise budgets were 
hardened and on-farm decision-making became independent. Farm managers 
became primarily concerned with turning a profit and their increased 
managerial efforts induced sharp shifts in input use, management reforms and 
efficiency increases. In contrast, large farm restructuring in Russia was far less 
profound. Russian large farm decision-making still has important features 
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similar to those of the traditional collective farm structures. Farm leaders are 
still committed to provide all members with jobs, regardless of cost-efficiency 
considerations, obliged by tradition and sometimes by government pressure to 
maintain the social infrastructure of the village.  
 
9. The continuation of these inefficient practices is linked to the continuation of soft 
budget constraints as the government continued to tolerate non-payment of 
farm debts. In Russia and countries such as Kazakhstan initial attempts at 
reform involved little real change in patterns of ownership management and 
control because up to 1998 the former state and collective farms were never 
subjected to a hard budget constraint. Without the sanction of the threat of 
bankruptcy there was little incentive for farm managers either to reduce their 
indebtedness or to reform their internal governance.  
 
10. Interestingly, in several transition countries “hybrid” farm organizations have 
emerged that seem to address the need for institutions that allow both better incentives 
and labour governance and create organizations that can capture scale economies. For 
example, Sabates-Wheeler (2002) finds that in Romania the most efficient farm 
organization for resource-constrained small farmers are “family societies” in 
which farmers collectively share in the provision of mechanized services. 
Mathijs and Swinnen (2001) find that “partnerships,” small groups of farmers 
in East Germany that pooled their effort in certain production and marketing 
tasks outperformed all other forms of farm organization between 1992 and 
1997. In Russia the most successful household farms refrain from registering as 
“private farms,” instead choosing to remain connected in some fashion to large 
farm enterprises. Such producers use their connections to gain access to inputs, 
marketing channels and other services in an environment where traditional 
markets, if any, function poorly (O’Brien et al, 2000).  
 
11. Successful institutions of exchange—nascent markets, forms of contracting, etc.—
also have many hybrid characteristics. In fact, some of the most successful 
transitions have not gone straight from planning to decentralized market-
based exchange. Markets are emerging, but doing so quite slowly. China’s 
experience demonstrates not only that, when politically feasible, partial reform 
by liberalizing some products but not necessarily all and by using a two-tier 
pricing system (i.e., a system of resource allocation that occurs half through 
planned transfers and half through the market) can end up creating markets 
that make the liberalization of the partially reformed sector successful. Such a 
reform strategy also has a longer run effect of gradually creating a trading 
class that leads the push to expand the reforms and ultimately eliminate the 
need for planning.  
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In Central Europe the re-emergence of vertically integrated supply chains 
reflects the necessity of private contract enforcement mechanism for credit 
distribution and input supply in the absence of well functioning public 
institutions. Other examples of non-traditional institutions in credit and input 
markets that appear successful in transition include a variety of financial 
instruments and enforcement institutions, including leasing of equipment, 
warehouse receipt systems, bank loan guarantees provided by processors to 
farms, trade credit, etc. Variations in such instruments and institutions reflect 
differences in commodities, local institutions and economic structure. To be 
successful these transition innovations have to adapted and flexible to address 
transition and local characteristics. 
 
Hence, whether considering institutions that create and maintain property 
rights or those that facilitate exchange, policies should accommodate 
institutions that are flexible. Flexibility is needed because transition is so 
uncertain and because there are many constraints that still are binding. 
Moreover, successful transition may trigger rapid growth which itself will 
require institutions to adapt quickly. For example, in land markets, the initial 
focus should be on stimulating short term land leasing, an institution much 
more adapted to transition circumstances. Later on, long-term leases and land 
sales can develop. In general, non-traditional and flexible institutions have 
been more successful. 
 
12. For any reform strategy to be successful it needs to include some essential 
ingredients. In other words, ultimately successful transition requires a complete 
package of reforms. All countries that are growing steadily a decade or more 
after their initial reforms have managed (a) to create macro-economic stability, 
(b) to reform property rights, and (c) to harden budget constraints (d) and to 
create institutions that facilitate exchange and develop an environment within 
which contracts can be enforced and new firms can enter.  
 
For example, when rights are not clear, as in Russia, producers have little 
incentive to farm efficiently or to invest and restructuring is constrained. We see 
in other places that the creation of strong individual property rights is not 
sufficient. For example, in Poland in the initial years after reform, farmers had 
secure rights over their land. But, their inability to access inputs or to sell output 
prevented them from reaping the gains of specialization and improved labour 
effort. Both output and productivity growth performed poorly. In general, in 
nations that created both rights and markets, productivity rises for most of the 
first decade of reform (at least after the initial transition); in those that they either 
rights or markets or both were ignored, productivity declines or is stagnant.  
 
  33Agrekon, Vol 44, No 1 (March 2005)  Swinnen 
 
 
13. That said, however, one of the most powerful lessons is that although all of the 
pieces of the reform package are needed, there is a lot of room for experimentation. 
Interestingly, if one chooses any two nations that had success, there almost 
always was variation in sequencing and in the form of the institutions that 
provided incentives and facilitated exchange. In other words, in our survey of 
the literature, we cannot find any single optimal transition path. The optimal 
transition strategy in any given country is one that contains the different parts 
of the package; the exact nature of the parts and the order in which they were 
implemented, however, has been different for each nation and takes into 
account the institutional and political characteristics of the country. 
 
In terms of sequencing, while all of the ingredients are ultimately needed, our 
paper also has shown that reform policies do not need to come all at once. For 
example, in China and Vietnam, reform without collapse was possible by 
introducing property rights reform first and gradually implementing policies 
that liberalized markets and facilitate decentralized exchange. Such 
sequencing helped transition nations in East Asia grow rapidly in the initial 
years and steadily since. In CEE, however, after the initial politically led 
disruptions, the gradual emergence of well-defined property rights, markets 
and other means of exchanging goods, services and inputs have led to steady 
productivity growth.  
 
14. The optimality of different sequences of policies (as well as the government’s ability 
to implement them) almost certainly depends on the structure of the relationships 
between agriculture and the rest of the economy.  There were important differences 
between East Asia versus Central Asia and Russia in this respect, which reflect 
the different stages of development of the agri-food systems in each region of 
the transition world. While the relationships in the food systems of China and 
Vietnam were fairly basic, farms in the Central Europe and Russia needed to 
be integrated into a much more industrialized agro-food supply chain. Under 
the Soviet system, the tasks of providing inputs to farmers, storage, 
processing, transport, and road infrastructure were all allocated to different 
agencies. Warehouses and processing plants were hundreds of miles away. 
Hence, productivity improvements at the farm level would cause less impact 
unless simultaneous problems at processing and input supply industries 
would be addressed. This required m o r e  o f  a n  e n c o m p a s s i n g  a n d  
simultaneous reform approach beyond the farm sector, including the 
restructuring of food processing companies, retailers and agricultural input 
suppliers. In terms of administrative feasibility, the much more industrialized 
nature of the agri-food supply chain (meaning a more complex set of 
exchanges between a variety of companies) and the fact that the various steps 
were functionally separated in the central planning system in CEE and CIS 
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were a severe constraint on optimal sequencing. A more gradual and 
orchestrated policy sequencing of a gradual reform strategy in the more 
developed economies in CEE (versus China and Vietnam), would have 
required more extensive information on the transformation process and the 
economy. In fact, most observers question the feasibility of plotting out any 
type of rational, systematically executed reform path ex-ante. As McMillan 
(1997:232) puts it: “If it were possible to plan the transition it would have been 
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